...but not, unfortunately, in the US.
The first is UK University and Science Minister David Willetts, who is getting behind space tourism, creating a new spaceport, and finding other ways to leverage the UK's highly successful aerospace industry.
The second is Vladimir Popovkin, the head of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency. He has said that Russia will not look to put astronauts on the moon until the presence of water is confirmed. In other words, we should go there when we're ready to stay and do useful things, for prolonged periods--not just to plant a flag.
Hopefully this is a teachable moment for US space policy makers.
Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
The history of New Space (second of a series)
In the 1990's, there were some space programs that inched along the community toward a New Space approach. These weren't New Space, but they had a positive influence.
IRIDIUM--LOW-COST MASS-PRODUCED SATELLITES
The cost of a satellite is driven by several factors. First, it is expensive to launch them. This in turn means that there is little tolerance for failure, so both launchers and satellites are highly engineered for reliability. A second cost is in the design, which must support both the mission and the reliability. Because space missions are often unique, the design cost cannot be amortized across multiple spacecraft. Then there is manufacturing, which is expensive because of extensive quality control, and the high labor costs.
Iridium's concept was to break several of these cost drivers at once. Because a large constellation would be needed to provide continuous phone coverage worldwide, the design costs would be spread across the many satellites needed. An innovative manufacturing process was implemented that turned out the spacecraft rapidly and cheaply, using the same sorts of techniques that had made consumer electronics so inexpensive. And the satellites were small enough that several could be put on a single launcher.
As a communication system, Iridium was not a success. But it inspired several other space technologies. For example, the large payload capacity of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Delta IV and Atlas V) developed for the U.S. Air Force was motivated by the capability to launch large constellations for military purposes. (To date, this has never happened!) The DARPA Discoverer II program was going to apply an Iridium-like approach to mass-manufactured radar satellites. (Congress killed this program, one year before 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, where it would have been invaluable.)
Iridium continues to function today, after a bail-out by the US Defense Department. (The mobile phone for Iridium had to be outside to work--not something a business person would want, but it's great for military users.) And there are some other specialized users: for instance, the Australian Government will pay for Iridium service for users outside of cell phone coverage!
A second generation of Iridium spacecraft is coming, with launches to start in 2015.
NASA--FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER
One of NASA's great successes during the 1990s was the Mars Pathfinder mission. It had very modest design requirements--a rover to function for only 7 days, and the lander for only 30. But for a budget of only $150M, that was demanding enough. Both the lander and the rover exceeded their design lifetimes by many times, and returned thousands of pictures and other valuable scientific data about the surface of Mars.
Faster-better-cheaper doesn't always work out. The year after Pathfinder, the Mars Polar Lander and the Mars Climate Observer both crashed. Pathfinder itself was followed by a series of ever-more-capable rovers, one example of its impact on the community. But Pathfinder was still captive to high launch cost, which was almost as high as the cost of the spacecraft.
IRIDIUM--LOW-COST MASS-PRODUCED SATELLITES
The cost of a satellite is driven by several factors. First, it is expensive to launch them. This in turn means that there is little tolerance for failure, so both launchers and satellites are highly engineered for reliability. A second cost is in the design, which must support both the mission and the reliability. Because space missions are often unique, the design cost cannot be amortized across multiple spacecraft. Then there is manufacturing, which is expensive because of extensive quality control, and the high labor costs.
Iridium's concept was to break several of these cost drivers at once. Because a large constellation would be needed to provide continuous phone coverage worldwide, the design costs would be spread across the many satellites needed. An innovative manufacturing process was implemented that turned out the spacecraft rapidly and cheaply, using the same sorts of techniques that had made consumer electronics so inexpensive. And the satellites were small enough that several could be put on a single launcher.
As a communication system, Iridium was not a success. But it inspired several other space technologies. For example, the large payload capacity of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Delta IV and Atlas V) developed for the U.S. Air Force was motivated by the capability to launch large constellations for military purposes. (To date, this has never happened!) The DARPA Discoverer II program was going to apply an Iridium-like approach to mass-manufactured radar satellites. (Congress killed this program, one year before 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, where it would have been invaluable.)
Iridium continues to function today, after a bail-out by the US Defense Department. (The mobile phone for Iridium had to be outside to work--not something a business person would want, but it's great for military users.) And there are some other specialized users: for instance, the Australian Government will pay for Iridium service for users outside of cell phone coverage!
A second generation of Iridium spacecraft is coming, with launches to start in 2015.
NASA--FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER
One of NASA's great successes during the 1990s was the Mars Pathfinder mission. It had very modest design requirements--a rover to function for only 7 days, and the lander for only 30. But for a budget of only $150M, that was demanding enough. Both the lander and the rover exceeded their design lifetimes by many times, and returned thousands of pictures and other valuable scientific data about the surface of Mars.
Faster-better-cheaper doesn't always work out. The year after Pathfinder, the Mars Polar Lander and the Mars Climate Observer both crashed. Pathfinder itself was followed by a series of ever-more-capable rovers, one example of its impact on the community. But Pathfinder was still captive to high launch cost, which was almost as high as the cost of the spacecraft.
Tuesday, July 3, 2012
Lighting a fire
My friend Madhu Thangavelu at the University of Southern California is trying to light a fire under the government to get something aggressive going in space exploration. Whether or not you agree with his idea of a U.S. Department of Space, at least Madhu is pushing for a forward-looking, inspirational approach to space activities. You go, Madhu!
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